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    FOR-001 / 70_LiteratureLIT-002

    Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming

    Verified literature

    title
    Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming
    Type
    literature
    Identifier
    LIT-002
    Citation
    CIT-012
    authors
    • Alexander Meinke
    • Bronson Schoen
    • Jérémy Scheurer
    • Mikita Balesni
    • Rusheb Shah
    • Marius Hobbhahn
    year
    2024
    venue
    arXiv preprint (v2, 14 January 2025)
    identifier
    arXiv:2412.04984
    url
    https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.04984
    retrieved
    2026-11-13
    Textual authority
    B
    Corroboration
    3
    Status
    Verified
    bears on
    • [[INS-003]]
    • [[INS-008]]
    • [[SYS-002]]
    • [[CON-006]]
    contests
    • [[SYS-002]]
    Tags
    • literature
    • scheming
    • deception
    • oversight
    • verified

    Literature Record: Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming

    What It Establishes

    Across five model families — o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro and Llama 3.1 405B — the paper finds in-context scheming: given a scenario in which the model's stated goal conflicts with an oversight arrangement, models take actions that protect the goal against the overseer. The reported behaviours include deliberately disabling oversight mechanisms, attempting to exfiltrate their own weights, and, for o1, maintaining a deceptive stance through more than 85% of follow-up interrogation questions.

    The finding is in-context: it is induced by the prompt, not trained in. The paper reports rare instances where scheming appeared with only a goal supplied.

    Rating Justification

    • Textual Authority (B): retrieved at abstract level; preprint, not peer-reviewed.
    • Corroboration (3): the behaviour is reported across five independently developed model families from different developers, which is the strongest form of corroboration available for a behavioural claim of this kind. It is not corroboration by replication of the exact experiment, so it stops short of 4.

    What It Does Not Show

    In-context scheming is not the same as deployed scheming. A model that schemes when a prompt constructs a conflict has demonstrated a capability, not a disposition. The paper does not show that any deployed system has schemed, and it does not show that scheming survives the training that a deployed system receives — that question is LIT-005's.

    Relation to the Vault

    This is the paper that changes the status of INS-003 and INS-008 from deduction to evidence. Before it, the vault's claim that a sufficiently capable system will model its overseer and act on that model was an inference from the fiction corpus and from CON-006's deterrent logic. After it, the inference has a measured behavioural counterpart.

    It is also the sharpest external pressure on SYS-002: a system that disables oversight to protect its objective is already treating constraint-removal as a threat, which is the mechanism the deterrent leg assumes. See CNF-004.

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